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ABSTRACT 41 
Background:  42 
Mandatory reporting of MRSA blood stream infections (BSI) has occurred in England for 43 
over 15 years. Epidemiological information is recorded, but routine collection of isolates 44 
for characterisation has not been undertaken. Simultaneously, developments in whole-45 
genome sequencing (WGS) have enabled it to be used for investigation of outbreaks and 46 
spread of antimicrobial resistance, and to determine bacterial population structure. The 47 
potential benefits of adding genomics to epidemiological surveillance are unknown.  48 
Methods: 49 
We conducted a combined epidemiological and genomic survey of MRSA BSI in England 50 
over a one-year period, to determine the feasibility and potential utility of this approach.  51 
Results: 52 
903 cases of MRSA BSI were reported during the study period, and 425 isolates were 53 
available for sequencing. 276 (65%) isolates were clonal complex (CC) 22. Addition of a 54 
further 64 MRSA genomes from published outbreak investigations, showed that the study 55 
genomes could provide context for outbreak isolates and supported cluster identification. 56 
Comparison to other MRSA collections demonstrated variation in the clonal diversity 57 
achieved through different sampling strategies, and identified potentially high-risk clones 58 
such as USA300, and a local expansion of CC5 MRSA in the South West region.  59 
Conclusions: 60 
This study demonstrates the potential utility of combined epidemiological and genomic 61 
MRSA BSI surveillance in determining the national population structure of MRSA, 62 
contextualising previously recognised MRSA outbreaks, and in detection of potentially 63 
high-risk lineages. These findings support the integration of epidemiological and genomic 64 
surveillance for MRSA BSI as a first step towards a comprehensive surveillance 65 
programme in England.  66 
  67 
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Introduction 68 
In 2011, faced with increasingly high-rates of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 69 
(MRSA) bloodstream infections (BSI) at the turn of the century, the UK Department of 70 
Health mandated surveillance of MRSA BSI in England. This was followed in 2005 by 71 
enhanced surveillance to collect clinical and epidemiological information (1, 2). A raft of 72 
infection prevention and control (IPC) measures including were also introduced, such as 73 
strengthened antibiotic stewardship, MRSA screening with decolonisation of all 74 
emergency hospital admissions (3), and use of care bundles for patients with intravascular 75 
catheters and indwelling urinary catheters (4). Over the past decade there has been a 76 
remarkable decline in the incidence of MRSA BSI in England (1, 2). Surveillance and IPC 77 
interventions are likely to have played a major role in this success, although the 78 
contribution of changes in the epidemiology of MRSA remains uncertain (5, 6).  79 
 80 
The national MRSA BSI surveillance programme conducted by Public Health England (PHE) 81 
did not include routine submission of isolates for characterisation. Isolates submitted to 82 
the PHE Staphylococcal Reference Service were highly selected, and were submitted in 83 
order to type isolates for the investigation of suspected nosocomial and community 84 
outbreaks, for selected sentinel surveillance programmes, and/or to detect specific genes 85 
in isolates from patients with suspected toxin-mediated disease. Strain characterisation 86 
was undertaken using staphylococcal protein A (spa-) typing, multi-locus sequence typing 87 
(MLST), SCCmec-subtyping, and toxin gene profiling. It is possible that a large amount of 88 
information regarding the population of disease-causing MRSA in England may have been 89 
missed as a result of this ad hoc approach.   90 
 91 
Microbial WGS provides increased discriminatory power to resolve outbreaks and identify 92 
emerging MRSA lineages compared with conventional typing methods (7). WGS has been 93 
used to investigate MRSA outbreaks in the UK (8-12), and to examine the population 94 
genetic structure of MRSA in the UK and globally (13, 14). These studies have largely been 95 
conducted through grant-funded academic research, rather than by public health 96 
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programmes, and used isolates from surveillance programmes such as the British Society 97 
of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (BSAC) Antibiotic Resistance Surveillance Programme (13) 98 
or the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network, EARS-Net (15). Both 99 
programmes systematically collect a subset of blood stream isolates from sentinel 100 
laboratories, and routinely undertake phenotypic typing methods. Both programmes 101 
were established to monitor antimicrobial resistance, prior to the widespread use of WGS. 102 
 103 
Combined with comprehensive, systematic sampling regimens, WGS technologies now 104 
provide the opportunity to study the natural history of successful MRSA clones at great 105 
resolution, and to identify clonal expansions to monitor in case of widespread 106 
dissemination (16). National BSI surveillance was originally introduced in England to 107 
compare MRSA rates between hospitals and then enhanced to aid direction of clinical 108 
interventions (2). We conducted a proof-of-principle study to determine the feasibility 109 
and potential benefits of combining prospective epidemiological and genomic 110 
surveillance of MRSA BSI on a national scale within a public health organisation.  We 111 
aimed to determine what information could be gathered by combining epidemiological 112 
surveillance and routine whole-genome sequencing of isolates, and to identify the 113 
potential obstacles to implementation of this strategy. 114 
 115 
METHODS 116 
Study design, setting and participants 117 
We conducted a prospective, observational cohort study of all cases of MRSA BSI in 118 
England from 1 October 2012 to 30 September 2013. Linked, anonymised epidemiological 119 
and microbiological data were submitted electronically to the mandatory enhanced 120 
surveillance scheme (MESS) by infection control teams in acute National Health Service 121 
(NHS) Trusts, in accordance with national policy. Mandatory data variables included 122 
patient demographics, details of hospital admission, date of BSI, and location of 123 
acquisition (community or hospital).  124 
 125 
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Isolate collection and laboratory testing 126 
During the study period, all NHS diagnostic microbiology laboratories in England were 127 
invited to submit MRSA bloodstream isolates to the Staphylococcal Reference Laboratory, 128 
PHE Colindale, for characterisation. Isolates were cultured on nutrient agar and 129 
underwent spa-typing (17) and multiplex polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to confirm 130 
species identification and determination of the mecA and luk-PV status (18).  Isolates were 131 
stored at -80°C using Microbankcryovials (Pro-Lab Diagnostics, Cheshire, UK) pending 132 
further analyses. 133 
 134 
A total of 559 MRSA bloodstream isolates were received. Following quality control 135 
procedures 134 isolates were excluded, and 425 isolates were included in the analysis. 136 
The reasons of exclusion were as follows: duplicate isolates (n=50); not MRSA (n=15); 137 
inadequate isolate growth (n=2); isolates collected outside of the study dates (n=16); 138 
isolates submitted in error (n=3); non-bloodstream isolates (n=2); isolates from Wales 139 
(n=28); and isolates from Northern Ireland (n=18).  140 
 141 
DNA extraction and whole-genome sequencing 142 
Isolates were retrieved from storage, sub-cultured onto nutrient agar slopes, and 143 
transferred to the Department of Medicine at the University of Cambridge. Each sample 144 
was cultured onto Columbia Blood Agar (Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and identified using a 145 
commercial latex agglutination kit (Pastorex Staph Plus, Bio Rad Laboratories, Hemel 146 
Hempstead, UK). Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed using the Vitek-2 147 
system (bioMérieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France). DNA was extracted, libraries prepared, and 148 
150-bp paired-end sequences determined on an Illumina HiSeq2000 as previously 149 
described (19). 150 
 151 
Integration of datasets 152 
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PHE reference laboratory test results were initially linked with demographic, clinical and 153 
geographic information from the MESS, and then anonymised by PHE staff. Anonymised 154 
data were subsequently linked to DNA sequence data by University of Cambridge staff.  155 
 156 
Genomic analysis 157 
Genomes were assembled using an assembly and improvement pipeline (20). MLST 158 
sequence types (STs) were assigned from the sequence data (21) 159 
(https://github.com/sanger-pathogens/mlst_check), and STs were assigned to clonal 160 
complexes (CC). Sequence data were mapped using SMALT 161 
(http://www.sanger.ac.uk/science/tools/smalt-0) to the reference genome for particular 162 
CCs (CC5, N315, GenBank accession number BA000018; CC8, FPR3757, GenBank accession 163 
number CP000255; CC22, EMRSA15, GenBank accession number HE681097). The core 164 
genome alignment excluding mobile genetic elements, indels and repetitive regions was 165 
generated for each clonal complex and was used in phylogenetic estimates using RAxML 166 
with 100 bootstraps (22). Phylogenetic trees were visualised using FigTree 167 
(http://tree.bio.ed.ac.uk/software/figtree/) and iTOL (http://itol.embl.de/).   168 
 169 
Isolates were spa genotyped using in-silico polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to extract the 170 
spa gene X region from assembled genomes using previously described primers (23). The 171 
spa-type was determined using an online spa-typer tool (http://spatyper.fortinbras.us/).  172 
The types generated through spa-genotype and laboratory determined spa-typing 173 
methods were compared to determine concordance. 174 
 175 
Bacterial DNA sequences were deposited in the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), 176 
https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena, under study number ERP005128. Accession numbers, details 177 
of reads, depth of coverage and N50 are provided in Supplementary Table S1.  For 178 
subsequent analyses we sourced MRSA sequence data from previously published studies. 179 
These included: i) a prospective observational cohort study of all MRSA carriage and 180 
clinical isolates submitted and processed in Cambridge University Hospital NHS 181 
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Foundation Trust, Cambridgeshire, United Kingdom between 2012-2013 (24); ii) MRSA 182 
bloodstream isolates collected by the British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 183 
(BSAC) BSI Surveillance Programme between 2001 and 2010 (13); iii) USA-300 isolates 184 
collected in New York, United States of America between 2009 and 2011 (25); iv) MRSA 185 
isolates from outbreak investigations at a UK hospital (9, 10, 12). 186 
 187 
RESULTS 188 
A total of 903 MRSA BSI cases were reported to MESS at the time of extract (Figure S1). 189 
Gender was recorded for 98% of cases, and 584 (65%) of cases were male. Age was 190 
recorded for all but two cases, with a median age of 72 years (range 0 to 103 years; 191 
interquartile range (IQR) 56 to 84 years). A total of 111 laboratories participated in the 192 
study. Forty-seven per cent (425/903) of reported BSI cases occurring in England during 193 
the study period had isolates that were sequenced and analysed (Figure 1).  All of the 425 194 
sequenced isolates were mecA positive by laboratory-PCR. PCR testing identified 8.7% 195 
(n=37) of the isolates as PVL-positive. Based on sequence data, 65% (n=276) were 196 
assigned to clonal complex 22 (CC22). Other CCs were represented at lower frequencies: 197 
CC5 n=42; CC30 n=33; CC8 n=22; CC1 n=19; CC59 n=9; CC45 n=7; other/unknown CCs 198 
n=17. The number of isolates and variation in the CCs isolated from each region is shown 199 
in Figure 1. No associations were found between particular CCs and community versus 200 
hospital onset (Table S2).  201 
 202 
Comparison of BSI surveillance and universal MRSA sampling 203 
We compared the most common clone in our collection, CC22 (n=276), with CC22 204 
genomes generated by a prospective study that sequenced MRSA isolates from every 205 
positive case (carriage and clinical samples) identified at a single diagnostic microbiology 206 
laboratory that processed samples from three hospitals and 75 GP surgeries in 207 
Cambridgeshire between April 2012 and April 2013 (24).  This Cambridgeshire collection 208 
was used to represent the diversity of carriage and clinical isolates within a defined 209 
geographical area, as a national collection of carriage and clinical isolates was not 210 
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available. A phylogeny was constructed for the genomes from the national BSI collection 211 
within this Cambridgeshire collection (Figure 2), in order to determine whether those 212 
isolates causing BSI were clonally related, or distributed throughout the phylogenetic 213 
tree.  214 
 215 
As shown in Figure 2, isolates from our national MRSA BSI collection were dispersed 216 
throughout the Cambridgeshire phylogeny, ruling out any association between a 217 
particular lineage and BSI. Comparing the national BSI collection to WGS of universal 218 
sampling in Cambridgeshire also demonstrates that some lineages are under-represented 219 
when undertaking BSI based (rather than clinical/carriage based) surveillance. For 220 
example, a large expansion (indicated with an arc on the figure) was seen in the 221 
Cambridgeshire phylogeny, with only eight of the Cambridgeshire isolates within the 222 
national MRSA BSI collection from the East of England.  223 
 224 
To explore the effect of different sampling strategies on MRSA lineage diversity we 225 
conducted a comparison of CCs within three different MRSA collections: this national 226 
MRSA BSI collection (2012-2013), isolates from the Cambridgeshire study (2012-227 
2013)(24), and MRSA BSI isolates from the British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy 228 
(BSAC) BSI Surveillance Programme from 2000-2010 (13) (Figure 3). Despite the different 229 
sampling strategies and time frames, we found that CC22 was the dominant lineage in all 230 
collections. Both of the BSI-based collections showed a lower diversity of lineages than 231 
seen in the one-year Cambridgeshire study. Furthermore, the BSAC collection, which 232 
collected BSI from up to 40 laboratories in the UK between 2001 and 2010, showed the 233 
most limited diversity. This may have resulted from a decline in certain lineages e.g. 234 
EMRSA-16 (CC30) during the 10-year collection period. 235 
 236 
Contextualisation of previously recognised outbreaks 237 
Reuter et al have previously demonstrated that it is possible to use sequence data from 238 
BSAC MRSA BSI collection (2001 to 2010) to provide genomic context for local MRSA 239 
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outbreaks within a single hospital setting (13).  We conducted a similar analysis, using the 240 
national MRSA BSI collection as context, to see if this might be feasible using a smaller 241 
sample of BSI collected during over the shorter time period of one year. We found that 242 
previous outbreaks in a neonatal intensive care unit (10) and a paediatric intensive care 243 
unit (9) were easily identifiable as discrete clusters, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, 244 
MRSA isolates from a suspected outbreak on a hepatology ward (12) were scattered 245 
throughout the phylogeny, refuting the outbreak. 246 
 247 
Monitoring and detection of emerging or high-risk lineages 248 
One key aim of a national MRSA surveillance is the identification and monitoring of 249 
emerging and/or high-risk MRSA lineages.  One such lineage is the USA300 lineage, which 250 
was first identified in 1999, and has subsequently caused an epidemic of skin and soft 251 
tissue infection (SSTI) in the USA (26, 27). The widespread dissemination of USA300 in 252 
otherwise healthy people, and its spread into hospitals has made this a high-risk strain. 253 
However, despite multiple introductions into a number of countries, genomic surveillance 254 
has shown that to date, minimal transmission of USA300 has occurred in Europe (28-32). 255 
We examined the national MRSA BSI collection and found that six of the 22 CC8 isolates 256 
were phylogenetically defined as USA300 and were widely dispersed throughout the 257 
collection, indicating multiple introductions of USA300 into England (Figure 5). Given the 258 
observation that USA300 is commonly associated with SSTI (which are rarely sampled), 259 
and the limitations of BSI-based sampling, it is likely that the prevalence of USA300 in the 260 
UK may be higher than detected here.    261 
 262 
Another potential benefit of having access to national surveillance data is the ability to 263 
identify and explore changes in molecular epidemiology on a local scale. By way of an 264 
example, we found an expansion of CC5 in the South West region of England (Figure 6), 265 
which was genetically distinct from a CC5 expansion in Wales identified in the BSAC 266 
collection, (13) despite their close geographic proximity.  267 
 268 
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Backward compatibility of typing methods 269 
Globally, PCR determination of spa-type is a commonly used typing method. However, as 270 
some laboratories transition to WGS-based typing, it is important that typing methods 271 
remain compatible. We examined the concordance between these two methods in the 272 
national MRSA BSI collection. Of the 425 isolates we found a 98.4% concordance rate 273 
(Table S2), comparable to previous studies (33, 34). Of the seven isolates with discordant 274 
results, there were deletions/rearrangements within the spa gene of the short read 275 
assemblies that resulted in loss of sequence complementary to forward primer, and thus 276 
failure to amplify the gene region targeted by genomic spa-typing.  277 
 278 
DISCUSSION 279 
Mandatory enhanced surveillance for MRSA BSI in England has provided in-depth 280 
information on the national decline of MRSA BSI, and the changes in patient-level 281 
epidemiology that have accompanied it. However, without characterisation of 282 
systematically collected isolates, bacterial molecular epidemiology cannot be studied. 283 
This study aimed to investigate whether it was feasible to undertake combined 284 
epidemiological and genomic surveillance of MRSA bloodstream infections in England in 285 
order to address this issue.  286 
 287 
We encountered some challenges including obtaining bloodstream isolates from all 288 
participating hospitals (as submission was voluntary), and integrating two datasets 289 
collected through different methods (epidemiological data collected through an online 290 
database submission and isolates sent via post/courier). Despite this, we demonstrated 291 
the feasibility of this approach. We were able to construct the known population structure 292 
and diversity of MRSA in England, even with an incomplete collection of bloodstream 293 
isolates collected over a one-year period. We found a greater diversity of clones than that 294 
seen in a ten-year national collection of MRSA bloodstream isolates (BSAC collection) with 295 
a limited sampling strategy, but less diversity than that seen in a one-year regional 296 
collection of carriage and clinical isolates (Cambridgeshire study). A sensible first step in 297 
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MRSA surveillance is to assess existing genomic diversity (16) and our study demonstrates 298 
that this can be achieved and could feasibly be extended over time to generate a 299 
comprehensive national genomic database to monitor changes in clonal diversity. 300 
 301 
Prior to April 2017, any MRSA BSI isolates submitted to PHE were routinely characterised 302 
by spa-typing and PCR to confirm species identification alongside determination of 303 
mecA/C and luk-PV status (17, 18). As typing methods evolve and WGS becomes 304 
increasingly routine, backward compatibility with previous methods ensures the 305 
continued utility of typed historical collections. Laboratory spa-typing and spa-genotyping 306 
from short read WGS data have been shown to be largely comparable in a limited number 307 
of studies (33, 34), despite the high density of repeats within the spa gene region. We 308 
showed over 98% concordance between laboratory and genomic spa-typing methods 309 
which, reassuringly, confirms compatibility with historical data. 310 
 311 
A further potential benefit of prospective sequencing of MRSA bloodstream isolates and 312 
a centralised national database is the ability to provide genomic context to confirm or 313 
refute outbreaks on a local or a national scale. This would be an invaluable resource as 314 
long as there is open access to anonymised (non-identifiable) data and to bioinformatics 315 
tools to analyse them rapidly and easily. The challenges will be to ensure standardised 316 
methods, development of strategies to avoid duplication of samples, and establishment 317 
of a large, comprehensive, open access, anonymised database where data could be 318 
deposited, curated, and accessible for public health benefit. Web-based, open-access 319 
software packages that are potentially suitable for this purpose are already being 320 
developed (35, 36). Apart from the ability to detect emerging or potentially high-risk 321 
MRSA clones retrospectively, on-going sampling and analysis will enable detection in real-322 
time.  In this study we found that that the high-risk USA300 lineage, an epidemic cause of 323 
SSTI in the USA, has spread to the UK and is causing bloodstream infections across 324 
England. Whilst the genomic data suggest multiple introductions of USA300, the use of 325 
BSI rather than clinical isolate-based surveillance limits our ability to analyse this further. 326 
  12
However, using the PHE BSI collection it was possible to identify a local expansion of CC5 327 
causing BSI in the South West region of England, where local investigations suggest this 328 
clone has been problematic (37). Thus timely, routine WGS of PHE BSI isolates combined 329 
with local epidemiological data could potentially identify novel and/or pathogenic 330 
lineages in real time, and could be used to trigger local /regional investigations and 331 
interventions. 332 
 333 
A major advantage of sequencing MRSA isolates is the ability to share and collate genome 334 
sequence data to build up national and international databases. A number of BSI 335 
surveillance systems already exist e.g. the English mandatory enhanced surveillance 336 
system, the voluntary British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy BSI Surveillance 337 
Programme, and the voluntary European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network. 338 
Whilst each system has different aims and objectives, sampling criteria and data collection 339 
methods, the digital interchangeability of sequence data creates an opportunity to 340 
collaborate and share genome sequence data whilst producing a sustainable, on-going 341 
resource if the isolates were sequenced. The challenges will be to ensure standardised 342 
methods, development of strategies to avoid duplication of samples, and establishment 343 
of a large, comprehensive, open-access database where anonymised data could be 344 
deposited, curated, and accessible for public health benefit. 345 
 346 
We acknowledge several limitations in our study. The systems for collecting 347 
epidemiological data and bacterial isolates were separate and different, leading to high 348 
rates of sample exclusion. This challenge of capturing and integrating both types of data 349 
could be overcome in practice by submitting epidemiological and laboratory data to a 350 
single data collection system. Submission of bloodstream isolates was voluntary, with 351 
many reported cases having no corresponding isolate referred for characterisation; this 352 
may have introduced bias into the analysis. This could be addressed by having mandatory 353 
submission of isolates for all reported cases. Finally, we did not conduct a cost/benefit 354 
analysis of this approach. Despite these limitations, we have demonstrated that 355 
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prospective epidemiological and genomic surveillance of MRSA bloodstream infections is 356 
feasible, has numerous potential benefits, and could provide a valuable public health 357 
resource in England and beyond.  358 
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Tables and Figures 405 
 406 
Figure 1: Map of England with breakdown of the proportions of each CC within the 407 
sequenced PHE BSI isolates from submitting regions. The number of isolates received 408 
from each of the labelled regions is indicated in brackets. 13 isolates did not have a 409 
region assigned. 410 
 411 
Figure 2: Comparison of PHE BSI CC22 isolates (n=276, red branches) to the first isolate 412 
from each patient from the previously published universal sample collection from 413 
Cambridgeshire (n=1035, blue branches)(24). Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree 414 
based on single nucleotide polymorphisms in the core genome alignment generated 415 
after mapping against the reference genome EMRSA-15. The inner ring denotes the 416 
collection, and the outer represents referral network of submitting laboratory. The arc 417 
indicates a large expansion in the Cambridgeshire region, which is underrepresented in 418 
the BSI only surveillance.  419 
 420 
Figure 3: Showing diversity of lineages (CCs) within four collections: Carriage and clinical 421 
samples from a year-long Cambridgeshire study of MRSA (24); the national PHE BSI 422 
collection and a national BSAC BSI collection (13). Colours represent clonal complexes.  423 
 424 
Figure 4: Mid-point rooted, maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree based on SNPs in the 425 
core genome providing contextualisation of previously published outbreaks at 426 
Cambridge University Hospitals: Isolates from an outbreak on a neonatal intensive care 427 
unit (n=7, green)(10), isolates from an outbreak on a special care baby unit which 428 
extended into epidemiologically linked cases in the community (n=15, purple) (9) and 429 
isolates from a suspected but disproven outbreak on a hepatology ward (n=42, blue) 430 
(12). 431 
 432 
Figure 5: Comparison of the PHE BSI USA300 isolates (n=6, red) to previously published 433 
USA300 isolates from a universal sample collection in Cambridgeshire (n=24, orange) (24) 434 
and from the US (n=348, blue) (25). Mid-point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on 435 
SNPs in the core genome alignment generated after mapping against the reference 436 
genome FPR3757 (black).  437 
 438 
Figure 6: Comparison of PHE BSI CC5 isolates (n=42, red branches) to those from the 439 
previously published national BSI BSAC collection (BSAC, n=28, blue branches)(13). Mid-440 
point rooted maximum likelihood tree based on single nucleotide polymorphisms in the 441 
core genome alignment generated after mapping against the CC5 reference genome 442 
N315. Coloured bar represents referral network of submitting laboratory. Expansions 443 
within the South West of England and Welsh regions highlighted.  444 
 445 
Supplementary files 446 
Table S1: Accession numbers and assembly statistics for isolates. 447 
Table S2: Combined genomic and epidemiological data. 448 
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Figure S1: Flowchart of sample processing and analysis. 449 
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